Abstract: Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) are used in many applications in the area of tracking and monitoring. WSNs have many constraints like low computational power, small memory, and limited energy resources. Most of the energy consumption is due to data transmission. For that we apply Data aggregation approach on the sensed data by the deployed sensor nodes. This approach helps to reduce the number of transmissions and improves the life time of wireless sensor network with less energy usage of sensor nodes and also to protect Data Aggregation process from various kinds of attacks becomes extremely critical. So we give some general framework for Secure Data Aggregation.

Keywords: wireless sensor network, sensor node, security, attacks, cluster, Data Aggregation.

I. INTRODUCTION

Wireless Sensor Networks are being employed in various real time fields like Military, disaster management, Industry, Environmental Monitoring and Agriculture Farming etc. Due to diversity of so many real time scenarios, security for WSNs becomes a complex issue. For each implementation, there are different type of attacks possible and demands a different security level. Major challenge for employing an efficient security scheme comes from the resource constrained nature of WSNs like size of sensors, Memory, Processing Power, Battery Power etc. and easy accessibility of wireless channels by good citizens and attackers.

Wireless sensor networks are usually deployed at unattended or hostile environments. Therefore, they are very vulnerable to various security attacks, such as selective forwarding, wormholes, and sybil attacks. In addition, wireless sensor networks may also suffer from injecting false data attack. For an injecting false data attack, an adversary first compromises several sensor nodes, accesses all keying materials stored in the compromised nodes, and then controls these compromised nodes to inject bogus information and send the false data to the sink to cause upper level error decision, as well as energy wasted in en-route nodes.

The Sensor Network can be described as a collection of sensor nodes which co-ordinate to perform some specific action. Unlike traditional networks, sensor networks depend on dense deployment and co-ordination to carry out their tasks. Sensor Networks consisted of small number of sensor nodes that were wired to a central processing station. However, nowadays, the focus is more on Wireless Sensor Networks.

Sensor networks are collection of sensor nodes which co-operatively send sensed data to base station. As sensor nodes are battery driven, an efficient utilization of power is essential in order to use networks for long duration hence it is needed to reduce data traffic inside sensor networks, reduce amount of data that need to send to base station. The main goal of data aggregation algorithms is to gather and aggregate data in an energy efficient manner so that network lifetime is enhanced. Wireless sensor networks (WSN) offer an increasingly Sensor nodes need less power for processing as compared to transmitting data. It is preferable to do in network processing inside network and reduce packet size. One such approach is data aggregation.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature review covers the background, latest development of and related techniques for secure data aggregation in Wireless Sensor Network (WSN). Data Aggregation is the process of combining the partial result at intermediate node during message routing in WSN. Literature survey is the most important step in software development process. Before developing the tool it is necessary to determine the time factor, economy n company strength. Once these things r satisfied, ten next steps is to determine which operating system and language can be used for developing the tool. Once the programmers start building the tool the programmers need lot of external support. This support can be obtained from senior programmers, from book or from websites. Before building the system the above consideration r taken into account for developing the proposed system.

We have to analysis the Parallel and distributed systems Survey:

Parallel and distributed computing

-“A distributed system is a collection of independent computers that appear to the users of the system as a single computer.”

-“A distributed system consists of a collection of autonomous computers linked to a computer network and equipped with distributed system software.”

-“A distributed system is a collection of processors that do not share memory or a clock.”

-“Distributed systems are a term used to define a wide range of computer systems from a weakly-coupled system such as wide area networks, to very strongly coupled systems such as multiprocessor systems.”
Distributed systems are groups of networked computers, which have the same goal for their work. The terms "concurrent computing", "parallel computing", and "distributed computing" have a lot of overlap, and no clear distinction exists between them. The same system may be characterized both as "parallel" and "distributed"; the processors in a typical distributed system run concurrently in parallel. Parallel computing may be seen as a particular tightly-coupled form of distributed computing, and distributed computing may be seen as a loosely-coupled form of parallel computing. Nevertheless, it is possible to roughly classify concurrent systems as "parallel" or "distributed" using the following criteria:

- In parallel computing, all processors have access to a shared memory. Shared memory can be used to exchange information between processors.

- In distributed computing, each processor has its own private memory (distributed memory). Information is exchanged by passing messages between the processors.

The figure on the right illustrates the difference between distributed and parallel systems. Figure 3(a) is a schematic view of a typical distributed system; as usual, the system is represented as a network topology in which each node is a computer and each line connecting the nodes is a communication link. Figure 3(b) shows the same distributed system in more detail: each computer has its own local memory, and information can be exchanged only by passing messages from one node to another by using the available communication links. Figure 4 shows a parallel system in which each processor has a direct access to a shared memory.

III. PROPOSED METHODOLOGY AND DISCUSSION

In this paper, we propose a novel bandwidth-efficient cooperative authentication (BECAN) scheme for filtering injected false data. Based on the random graph characteristics of sensor node deployment and the cooperative bit-compressed authentication technique, the proposed BECAN scheme can save energy by early detecting and filtering the majority of injected false data with minor extra overheads at the en-route nodes. In addition, only a very small fraction of injected false data needs to be checked by the sink, which thus largely reduces the burden of the sink. Both theoretical and simulation results are given to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed scheme in terms of high filtering probability and energy saving.

A statistical en-routing filtering mechanism called SEF. SEF requires that each sensing report be validated by multiple keyed message authenticated (MACs), each generated by a node that detects the same event. In SEF, to verify the MACs, each node gets a random subset of the keys of size $k$ from the global key pool of size $N$ and uses them to producing the MACs. To save the bandwidth, SEF adopts the bloom filter to reduce the MAC size. By simulation, SEF can prevent the injecting false data attack with 80-90 percent probability within 10 hops. SEF does not consider the possibility of en-routing nodes’ compromise, which is also crucial to the false data filtering. Present an interleaved hop-by-hop authentication (IHA) scheme for filtering of injected false data. In IHA, each node is associated with two other nodes along the path, one is the lower association node, and the other is the upper association node. An en-routing node will forward receive report if it is successfully verified by its lower association node. To reduce the size of the report, the scheme compresses $t+1$ individual MACs by XORing them to one. By analyses, only if less than $t$ nodes are compromised, the sink can detect the injected false data. However, the security of
the scheme is mainly contingent upon the creation of associations in the association discovery phase. Once the creation fails, the security cannot be guaranteed.

A. SENSOR NODE INITIALIZATION

In this technique, the key server generates unique public and private keys for each sensor node and sink. These keys will be shared to the sensor nodes when they start.

B. CNR BASED MAC GENERATION

This technique is used by the sensor nodes for generating authentication message. This technique uses Elliptic curve cryptography and DES algorithm.

C. CNR BASED MAC VERIFICATION

In this phase, the sink verifies the authentication message sent by sensor node using ECC algorithm.

D. SINK VERIFICATION

In this module, the sink verifies each message sent by sensor nodes weather it is valid or invalid.

E. ELLIPTIC CURVE CRYPTOGRAPHY (ECC)

It is an approach to public-key cryptography based on the algebraic structure of elliptic curves over finite fields. Public-key cryptography is based on the intractability of certain mathematical problems. Early public-key systems, such as the RSA algorithm, are secure assuming that it is difficult to factor a large integer composed of two or more large prime factors. For elliptic-curve-based protocols, it is assumed that finding the discrete logarithm of a random elliptic curve element with respect to a publicly-known base point is infeasible. The size of the elliptic curve determines the difficulty of the problem. It is believed that the same level of security afforded by an RSA-based system with a large modulus can be achieved with a much smaller elliptic curve group. Using a small group reduces storage and transmission requirements.

Let \( p \) be a large prime and \( E(\mathbb{F}_p) \) represent an elliptic curve defined over \( \mathbb{F}_p \). Let \( G \in E(\mathbb{F}_p) \) be a base point of prime order \( q \). Then, each sensor node \( N_i \in N \) can preload a TinyECC based public-private key pair \( (Y_i, x_i) \), where the private key \( x_i \) is randomly chosen from \( \mathbb{Z}^* \times q \) and the public key \( Y_i = x_i, G \). Noninteractive key pair establishment. For any two sensor nodes \( v_i \), \( v_j \in G \) no matter what \( e_{ij} \in \{0, 1\} \) is, sensor nodes \( v_i \) with the key pair \( (Y_i, x_i) \) and \( v_j \) with the key pair \( (Y_j, x_j) \) can establish a secure Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key pair without direct contacting, where \( k_{ij} = x_i Y_j = x_i x_j G = x_j x_i G = x_j Y_i = k_{ji} \). \( v_i \) and \( v_j \) can secretly share a key. At the same time, the established keys are independent. In other words, if a sensor node \( v_i \) is compromised, then the key \( k_{ij} \) shared between \( v_i \) and \( v_j \) will be disclosed. However, the key \( k_{jj'} \) shared between \( v_j \) and another sensor node \( v_j' \) is not affected.

F. DESIGN RATIONALE

To filter the false data injected by compromised sensor nodes, the BECAN adopts cooperative neighbor router (CNR) based filtering mechanism. As shown in Fig. 5 CNR-based mechanism, when a source node \( N_0 \) is ready to send a report \( m \) to the sink via an established routing path \( RN_0: [R_1 \rightarrow R_2 \rightarrow \ldots \rightarrow R_l \rightarrow \text{Sink}] \), it first resorts to its \( k \) neighboring nodes \( NN_0: \{N_1, N_2, \ldots, N_k\} \) to cooperatively authenticate the report \( m \), and then sends the report \( m \) and the authentication information MAC from \( N_0 \cup NN_0 \) to the sink via routing \( RN_0 \).
IV. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION

We now analyze the security of our proposed scheme to authenticate the measurement reports. The performance metrics include (i) **filtering efficiency** is defined as the probability of false data to be filtered out within a number of hops, (ii) **attack resilience** is defined as the ratio of compromised components (clusters) vs. the total components (clusters) in the system, and (iii) **filtering capability** is defined as the average forwarded hops of false measurement reports, i.e., the average hops that the false measurement report will be forwarded before being detected and filtered. The overhead analysis of PCREF in terms of storage and energy cost can be found. Note that, with no knowledge of authentication information revealing to the attacker, the probability of the MAP of measurement to be successfully forged by the attacker can be largely ignored.

A. FILTERING EFFICIENCY

PCREF requires that each legitimate measurement report attaches $T$ valid MAPs. When the attacker compromises $x (x < T)$ sensing nodes in the cluster and obtains $x$ authentication polynomials to derive $x$ valid MAPs, he has to attach other forged $T - x$ MAPs in the forged report in order to successfully send the forged measurement to the controller. In PCREF, each intermediate node stores the check polynomial for a cluster with the predefined probability $P$. After receiving the measurement report, the intermediate node verifies all $T$ MAPs carried in the report to detect and filter out the false measurement reports. Hence, when $x < T$, the probability of a false measurement report filtered by the intermediate node is $P_f = P$. Let the probability of a false measurement report filtered after being forwarded $h$ hops be $P_h$ and the probability of a false measurement report filtered within $h$ be $P'_h$.

We have

$$P_h = (1 - P_f)^h - 1 \cdot P_f;$$

$$P'_h = 1 - (1 - P_f)^h;$$

The filtering efficiency of PCREF can be represented by $P'_h$ defined as the probability of false measurement report to be filtered within a number of hops. Obviously, the greater the probability, the better the filtering efficiency becomes. Numerical data in Figure 3 show the filtering efficiency vs. the forwarded hops when $P = 0.1; 0.2; 0.5$. As we can see, PCREF can filter most of false measurement reports en-route, and thus it can detect and filter the false measurement reports effectively. In addition, the higher the value of $P$, the smaller the forwarded hops required to filter the false measurement reports. The reason is that the probability of the check polynomial stored at the intermediate node increases as $P$ increases. However, each intermediate node stores $(N = n) \cdot P$ check polynomials, and the smaller $P$ can reduce the storage overhead of the intermediate node.

B. RESILIENCE TO ATTACK

We now analyze the resilience of PCREF to the number of compromised nodes. Because of the derivation from different primitive polynomials bundled with node ID, the authentication polynomial in compromised node could not be used to launch...
the node impersonating attack against the legitimate node. According to the filtering rules of PCREF, the measurement report is false if more than one MAP carried in the report is not derived from the primitive polynomial assigned to the cluster, where the report generates. Hence, to forge a “legitimate” false measurement report, the attacker shall compromise several sensing nodes and obtain $T$ or more authentication polynomials of the attached cluster. In this way, he can successfully forge the false measurement report of the targeted monitored component without being detected by our scheme. In PCREF, to obtain $T$ authentication polynomial of the target cluster, the attacker shall consider the cases listed below and our analysis will be based on these two cases:

1: Use the check polynomial and authentication polynomial stored in compromised sensing nodes and forwarding nodes to derive the primitive polynomial of the target cluster and derive enough valid authentication polynomials via the derived primitive polynomial.

2: Compromise $T$ or more sensing nodes in the target cluster and obtain authentication polynomials stored in them.

V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH

In this paper, we have proposed a novel BECAN scheme for filtering the injected false data. This scheme achieves not only high en-routing filtering probability but also high reliability with multi-reports and timestamp. Due to this the BECAN scheme could be applied to the other fast and distributed network where authentication purpose is also distributed, e.g., authentication function in wireless mesh network. BECAN does not require complex security fixation because it uses non-interactive key establishment. In our future work, we will investigate how to prevent or reduce the gang injecting false data on mobile compromised sensor nodes.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

My thanks to the Guide, Prof. K.G.Badge and Principal Dr.A.B.Marathe, who provided me constructive and positive feedback during the preparation of this paper.

References


Miss. Priyanka G Padmane, received the B.E.degree in Information Technology from H.V.P.M’s College Of Engineering And Technology, Amravati in 2013. She is currently pursuing Master’s Degree in Computer Science and Information Technology from H.V.P.M’s College of Engineering And Technology, Amravati.

Prof. K.G. Bagde, received the B.E.and M.E degree in Computer Science from Prof.Ram Meghe College of Engineering And Technology, Amravati. Her field of specialisation is Networking. She is currently working as Associate Professor at H.V.P.M’s college of Engineering and Technology, Amravati.